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IN HER ESSAY on professional education and liberal arts 
education, Gail Summer from Lenoir-Rhyne College persuasively 
argues that colleges and universities need not choose between the 
two emphases but should instead welcome and appreciate Both-
And (see above pp. 22-29). In this essay, I too share her conviction 
that there is not an important divide between liberal arts and pro-
fessional education. My argument, however, is that there is a real 
division in the academy, but it is within rather than between these 
areas. Within both professional education and the liberal arts 
disciplines, the important division for consideration is between 
education for vocation versus education for technique. The former 
refers to the formative character of education that necessarily 
includes body, mind and spirit—all in service of our neighbors. 
The latter involves the objectification of knowledge and often the 
commoditization that follows objectification.
While the division between education for vocation and 
education for technique has long existed, it has frequently 
masqueraded or at least been understood as between liberal and 
professional education. In the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, when John Henry Newman offered his passionate defense 
of the liberal arts tradition in The Idea of a University, he chal-
lenged the view, increasingly held, that education’s proper end 
was practicality and usefulness. Newman feared an education 
providing only commercially useful expertise. When he speaks 
of professions and professional education, this is how he uses the 
terms. One of the examples Newman offers is the study of theol-
ogy where one could learn only how to give sermons and teach a 
catechism while ignoring contemplation of God (Newman 82). 
The problem with this type of usefulness, Newman says, is that 
a person can be “usurped by his vocation … His virtues, his sci-
ence, and his ideas are all to be put into a gown or uniform, and 
the whole man to be shaped, pressed and stiffened, in the exact 
mould of his technical character” (Newman 121). The result is 
that the public purposes of education are lost, the education 
of the whole person is abandoned, and all that remains are the 
private economic gains of the individual who has been trained.
But what appeared to be a divide between professional and 
liberal education became much more complicated soon after 
Newman’s important work. In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, there was an increasing focus on research 
and expertise within the liberal arts and sciences along with a 
methodology and epistemology of teaching and research that 
espoused objectivity as the central value. Professors were to 
be subject-matter experts in their disciplines, leading to what 
William James would call in jest the “Ph.D. Octopus.” The 
doctoral degree became the sign of expertise, and every college, 
no matter how small or what its mission, wanted these research 
experts on its faculty. Gone were the days when learned pastors 
could provide instruction in multiple disciplines—even at 
denominational colleges. As James noted a century ago, there 
was no guarantee that a Ph.D. could teach nor did a doctoral 
exam say anything about the “moral, social and personal charac-
teristics” of the person. To be blunt, these things did not matter 
(James 3). Likewise, those faculty and those disciplines who did 
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not possess the Ph.D. were seen as inferior because their claim to 
expertise often came through experience rather than research.
Objectivist Education
Educator and writer Parker Palmer has described this develop-
ment as the move to an epistemology of “objectivism” because 
it makes objectivity the primary characteristic of academic 
work. Palmer says that objectivism “begins by assuming a 
sharp distinction between the knower and the objects to be 
known. The objects exist ‘out there,’ apart from and inde-
pendent of the knower. They wait, passive and inert, for us 
to know them” (Palmer 27). And when we do come to know 
them, the resulting knowledge is also like a thing. It is a fact 
or skill that belongs to the individual knower and that can be 
manipulated by the knower according to his or her will. Even 
more, it can be bought and sold on the marketplace, making 
knowledge a commodity. When certain objects of knowledge 
do not have commercial value, then they are easily dismissed as 
esoteric and worthless.
Palmer contrasts this way of knowing with the traditional 
notion of “truth” as the authentic academic task. According to 
Palmer, “That word, once central to any discussion of knowing, 
teaching and learning … is not used much these days (because 
it is) not crucial to our conversations about the knowledge we 
value” (30). It is viewed as “romantic,” but in neglecting it we 
also abandon what it represented. The word truth is much more 
relational in its understanding of knowledge, with etymological 
connections to words like “trust” and “troth.” In the pursuit of 
truth, knowledge becomes a series of relationships—between 
knower and known but also between the knower and fellow 
knowers (Palmer 31-32). Further, the use of knowledge is always 
connected to its discovery.
The focus on objectivity in the pursuit of expertise, epito-
mized in the Ph.D., meant that the college or university’s social 
mission was transformed as well. The social mission was fre-
quently reduced to training mini-experts and producing original 
research instead of shaping and forming young people spiritu-
ally, morally and communally. Even a phrase like “knowledge 
for its own sake”—a phrase that Newman would have likely 
endorsed in a different context—now too frequently affirms 
an objectification of knowledge that removes the creation 
and dissemination of knowledge from the lives of real people, 
communities, and the natural world.1 At best in the objectivist 
curriculum, theology and ethics became add-ons. At worst, they 
were seen as unwelcome intrusions and a barrier to value-free 
inquiry. The list of church-related schools that abandoned their 
distinctive Christian mission for objectivity and “academic 
excellence” through technical expertise is too long to recount. 
Sadly, it includes some of our sister Lutheran colleges.
The professions pursued a similar path as they increasingly 
became yoked with colleges and universities as sources of train-
ing. Professionals became more and more associated with their 
expertise in a certain area and less and less associated with “the 
social importance of the knowledge they provide and the func-
tions they perform for the community” (Sullivan). In the past, 
professional formation occurred through apprenticeship. In the 
ancient world, the young person would go and live along-side the 
master worker who would teach the craft and help form the boy’s 
character. It was even the master’s responsibility to provide for the 
religious instruction and spiritual life of the child. Apprenticeship 
was a holistic education. In the new academic environment where 
professionals were becoming trained, professors were increasingly 
defined by expertise and so too were those they taught.
The result of these developments is that, for the average 
person, the word “professionalism” now refers most often to 
high quality work (Stackhouse 15). Professionals are society’s 
experts—whether it be accounting, education, college faculty, 
law, or any other example. But professionalism is more than 
that, or at least it should be more than that. The professions have 
traditionally been highly regarded in American society because 
of their ability to integrate professional expertise with a wider 
sense of public responsibility. American society has a lingering 
belief, perhaps nostalgia or perhaps idealism, that profession-
als are not simply highly skilled people who become “hired 
guns.” They should have social and cultural commitments for 
the public good that transcend the knowledge expertise needed 
to accomplish their occupations. Their educational privilege 
and social position should foster a sense of duty and obligation, 
and it is this commitment to social responsibilities that confers 
legitimacy. In other words, professionals warrant respect not 
only because of their technical, political or economic authority 
but also from their moral and cultural authority, arising from 
their commitment to society and its well-being.
Historically and very recently, when broader concerns for the 
public good have been neglected, public distrust of professionals 
has flared. We also witness the decline of the professions when 
doctors, lawyers and accountants are seen as greedy and not pro-
tecting the public good. We curse lawyers who seek riches to the 
exclusion of justice; we condemn accountants who are willing 
to “cook the books” rather than seek the welfare of stockholders 
and society; and we worry when our nurse treats us like a body 
with an insurance card instead of a human being worthy of dig-
nity and respect. Certainly, all professionals have the potential 
for corruption, but as professionals trade their knowledge on the 
marketplace we worry that we can no longer trust them. We are 
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at the point when we must look at our professionals as we look 
at any other product, cautioning ourselves with the motto caveat 
emptor—let the buyer beware.
Yet professional education is not alone in these developments. 
The rise of objectivism in the sciences and even in the humani-
ties has created a similar focus on technical study and expertise. 
Reflecting on the professionalization of literary studies, Geoffrey 
Galt Harpham describes how, at the same time literary studies 
was becoming less accessible to the public reader because of its 
use of technical jargon and theory, “one of the many by-products 
of that profusion was a sharp spike in professorial self-esteem” 
(Harpham 69-70). The use of jargon and technical knowledge 
that created outsiders and insiders was necessary for the develop-
ment of professional identity, but the most grievous result was 
that the study of literature lost its formative power in the lives of 
students. In the marketplace, this is a problem because this objec-
tification and technical understanding of literature has little or 
no pecuniary value the way that professional knowledge or some 
scientific knowledge has, so it is dismissed as worthless. This is the 
charge, most often heard against humanities faculty, that they are 
“egghead professors” who do not understand or connect with the 
“real world” outside their classroom. Humanities majors even joke 
that they are only economically qualified to say, “do you want fries 
with that.”2  Those who criticize the objectification of knowledge 
in the professions and express concern over their commoditiza-
tion are likely to be seen as liberals because of their concerns 
about the unrestrained free market of “human capital.” Ironically, 
those who criticize the objectification of the humanities through 
theory-laden discourse are sometimes viewed as cultural conserva-
tives because they emphasize instead that the humanities convey 
important values and traditions.
With both professional education and the liberal arts dis-
ciplines subject to objectivism, higher education can be often 
reduced to a knowledge factory. Students come in, and colleges 
equip them with current knowledge presumably for a successful 
career or perhaps for no apparent use at all. Parents and students 
see higher education as a ticket to a good, professional job and 
the only path to a financially secure lifestyle. “Value for your 
money” becomes the guiding principle, and students along with 
parents worry whether they are getting their money’s worth. 
Colleges and universities want to make sure that students get 
the training and expertise they need so that they can succeed in 
the marketplace or get into the graduate school of their choice, 
pay off their student loans, contribute back to their alma mater, 
and attract more students. Some scholars like Stanley Fish even 
actively argue against any understanding of moral formation in 
higher education, arguing that it is outside the realm of faculty 
expertise (Fish A23), but they unwittingly make colleges and 
universities more market-driven as a result because there is no 
means left by which to judge objectivist knowledge except by the 
values of the economic marketplace. Sadly, when colleges follow 
such a path, they look little different than the truck driving 
school advertised on TV, except for the subjects taught and the 
prices charged.
Vocation and Education
Yet places like our Lutheran colleges were not founded for the 
purpose of creating and disseminating objects of knowledge. They 
did not count on an invisible hand in either the marketplace of 
ideas or the marketplace of commerce but instead had faith in 
God for what they considered to be a religious mission expressed 
in education. In his teaching on education, Martin Luther insisted 
that schools and education were absolutely essential to the life 
of a community, and establishing and maintaining them was a 
Christian responsibility because God has entrusted young people 
to our care (LW 45:353). Luther advocated study of the liberal arts, 
and he dismissed the arguments—even then—that a classical, 
liberal education was a waste of time and money (LW 46:217). 
An education was valuable because it prepared young people for 
service in a variety of roles and responsibilities, as well as for the 
general responsibilities of good citizenship. In this way, education 
was, for Luther, closely tied to a more foundational concept in his 
emerging theology—that is, the vocation and calling of all God’s 
people. In their vocations, Luther asserted, Christians become 
“little Christs,” ministering to and serving one another in unself-
ish and Christ-like ways (“Freedom” 618). 
As you might imagine, there is a close relationship between 
vocation and profession, and it can be explored both etymo-
logically and theologically. First, by studying the word “profes-
sional” we learn that the term is not rooted in the language 
describing expertise. Rather, its basis is in the word “profess.” 
In the Middle Ages, what distinguished the professional was 
not solely his knowledge but the requirement that a profes-
sional take an oath. Echoes of these ancient professions are still 
heard even today. Formal ethics codes also define the various 
“With both professional education and 
the liberal arts disciplines subject to 
objectivism, higher education can be 
often reduced to a knowledge factory.”
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missions of the professions and set forth the responsibility and 
ethical guidelines which professionals will follow. These oaths 
are often taken in formal admission ceremonies when someone 
joins a profession or a professional society. Whether ordina-
tion as a pastor or taking the Hippocratic Oath as a physician, 
there is a ritual division made between the professional and an 
ordinary person, defining the contexts, purposes and public 
responsibilities of a particular role.
Etymologically, another interesting word to consider, as a 
contrast, is “career.” Ethicist William May has pointed out that 
“career” and the word “car” stem from the same root. The root is 
the medieval French word for racetrack, and both career and car 
“refer to movement—to the ways in which we get off and run-
ning” (May 16). May expands this image, writing:
Both car and career refer increasingly today to private 
means of transportation. The modern car appeals to us 
because it lets us travel alone… It frees us from traveling 
with others; it saves us from the body contact of public 
transportation. Even though a car takes us out into the 
public streets, it wraps us in a glass-enclosed privacy as 
we race down public thoroughfares. Similarly, a careerist 
tends to calculate privately, even in public places. At the 
beginning of his race, he asks, what will I be? What career 
will best serve my interests—provide me with the means, 
in both money and power, to satisfy my wants? In the 
course of the journey he asks, what moves shall I make to 
get where I want to go, and most speedily? Whom shall 
I cultivate? Whom, avoid? And at the end of the race, 
he looks back on the track, the honors won, the fortune 
acquired, the opportunities misses, the mistakes made, 
and wonders whether it was all worthwhile. In such a race, 
questions of public obligation and responsibility fade to 
the marginal and episodic. (May 16-17)
So, when people refer to the “rat race,” there is more than 
humor involved.
Turning to theology, the connection between vocation and 
profession is one of call and response. In a vocation or calling, 
Christians come to know gifts, talents and abilities as well as 
where they may best be used in the world as service to God and 
neighbor. We also find ourselves connected to the rich bibli-
cal tradition of calling from the call of Abraham to the call of 
Matthew the tax collector, from the call of Jonah and his reluc-
tant response to the call of Saul on the road to Damascus. When 
we discover and claim a sense of personal calling, and when our 
students do the same, we and they become part of this biblical 
tradition; they become part of God’s work to call humanity to 
be in relationship to God and in relationship to each other. And 
we become like the young Samuel who hears God calling in the 
night and finally responds by saying, “speak Lord, your servant 
is listening.” In their oath-taking, professionals publicly accept 
the responsibilities of their distinctive calling and pledge to use 
their gifts in just and socially responsible ways. The point is that 
a calling and a profession are more than expertise that can be 
exploited to the highest bidder. A profession is not a career but a 
relationship—a relationship with your fellow human beings and 
a relationship with the God who called you into existence with 
the distinctive gifts that make your service possible.  
I am convinced that the distinctive place of church-related col-
leges in higher education is to uplift the centrality of vocation and 
calling in teaching and learning. For Lutherans colleges especially, 
it is our birthright. We all know that we are involved in helping 
students in the discernment process. We help students to recog-
nize their gifts and abilities by both praising them and correcting 
them. We serve as mentors who listen and provide counsel. We 
provide both curricular and co-curricular opportunities for stu-
dents to explore different vocational areas. We also equip students 
with knowledge that will allow them to serve in meaningful ways. 
Simply to have a call is inadequate unless you have the skills neces-
sary to fulfill it. Again, expertise and purpose are always related; 
they cannot be separated.
Recently in higher education, there has been a great deal 
of emphasis on ethics. We hear the need for students to take 
ethics courses and hear ethics lectures. Colleges and universi-
ties even establish new positions in ethics; my endowed chair 
in ethics was established over ten years ago for this very reason. 
Ethics alone is an inadequate strategy, however, because it too 
can become overly technical. The task is not for students to 
learn moral theory but for them to become good. This type of 
formation can occur in ethics classes but also via novels, film 
and exposure to a wide variety of disciplines and approaches. 
The current movements to expand service learning, commu-
nity-based research, and internships, practica, and clinicals are 
to be hailed as opportunities for students to engage the world, 
to be guided by mentors and to yoke expertise with service and 
social responsibility. I would also argue that general education, 
by its very nature, should be understood as moral education. 
“The connection between vocation and 
profession is one of call and response.”
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In teaching critical thinking skills and breadth of knowledge, 
we empower students to evaluate traditions and arguments, to 
understand the world and others; we foster creativity, problem-
solving and imagination; and we challenge students to consider 
the inter-relatedness of issues.
Church-related liberal arts colleges have a distinctive 
advantage in this approach to higher education and have the 
opportunity to provide leadership in a way not available previ-
ously recognized. Whereas before it seemed that we were at a 
disadvantage because we could never provide the expertise of 
research universities, I say we now have the advantage because of 
our theological grounding, our emphasis on moral formation, 
our attention to good teaching, and our continued emphasis 
on calling and vocation. From the founding of our institutions 
we have told our students that their education is not just about 
them, the information they will learn, and the skills they will 
require. It is about what they can do for their neighbors and for 
their communities. It is about how they will serve their God in 
word, deed, and example.
Vocation and Culture
But more is needed. Moral formation is needed that can with-
stand the powerful allure and force of cultural values as well 
as the values of the many organizational sub-cultures in which 
our graduates will live and work. As countless authors have now 
written, an organization’s culture (and the various subcultures 
within it) creates an identity and value system. We are often 
forced to choose between organizational and other identities 
since the values inherent in them are incompatible. Even more, 
loyalty to an organization can blind individuals to the ethical 
issues that confront them (Rion 542). 
To understand this further, a sociological distinction is 
helpful. When an immigrant is described as “assimilated,” 
this means she has accepted the new group’s values, and it also 
indicates her full acceptance by the new group. Not only is 
acceptance by the new group required, but the assimilated indi-
vidual actually has a new reference group by which her identity 
is determined. Identity is transferred, and the old identity is lost 
(Teske and Nelson 359, 365). When an immigrant is described 
as “acculturated,” the individual seeks or finds it necessary and 
advantageous to assume a shared identity with the new group. 
This may or may not include adoption of the group’s values and 
ends, but it almost always includes adopting their means and 
methods. If values are adopted, in acculturation the person may 
adapt and re-orient those values in a new way, giving them new 
meaning (Teske and Nelson 355-56). An example of accultura-
tion may be an immigrant who learns the values and ways of 
life in a new region without fully adopting those values or being 
completely socialized into the new society. With other members 
of her community of origin, she may still speak her native lan-
guage and practice her native culture’s tradition, and her native 
culture will continue to affect how she approaches issues and 
problems in her new society. 
While comparing our students and graduates to immigrants 
may sound strange, the distinction between acculturation and 
assimilation is very useful. All previous identity is lost with 
assimilation, but in contrast, acculturation requires the indi-
vidual to maintain the original values and the new cultural 
values without value separation and switching. Successful 
acculturation requires understanding the values of a new culture 
(or subculture). But being able to appreciate and operate within 
a corporate culture is not the same as complete acceptance and 
accommodation to that culture. On a smaller scale and in a more 
specific context, acculturation corresponds to the ideal that 
Christian should be in the world but not of it. It also reflects the 
incarnational character of Christian vocation; to deny value to 
the corporate culture is a vocational version of docetism.3
To ensure that a concern for the larger public good continues, 
we need graduates who are acculturated but not assimilated. 
A degree of marginality is needed for all who live and work 
within diverse organizational cultures. The greatest challenge in 
professional ethics may be the ability to recognize that you are 
in the middle of a moral dilemma, and this is something that 
no ethics code can tell you. It is very easy to be so caught up in 
the organizational culture that problems appear to be in need of 
only technical solutions. They are seen as accounting problems 
or legal problems or finance problems or insurance problems 
because this is how the organizational culture interprets them. 
For this reason, a position of marginality provides one of the 
most powerful ethical resources for the profession. In fact, as 
I tell my students, ninety percent of the issue is whether you 
recognize the moral dilemma at all, or whether it goes sweeping 
past you in the guise of a technical concern. 
In the book Common Fire, the authors, including Sharon 
Daloz Parks and Laurent Parks Daloz, interviewed one hundred 
people who they believed modeled a commitment to the public 
good in their life and work (Daloz et al. 5). One of the most 
important commonalities among these extraordinary people was 
a sense of marginality. In fact, the authors refer to it as the “gift” 
of marginality. For some, the marginality was not chosen but 
was based on their race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or 
family background. But for another group, the marginality was 
based on values. Sometimes this value-based marginality was 
tied to religion and sometimes it was not. The authors conclude 
that the “central gift of marginality…is its power to promote 
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both empathy with the other and a critical perspective on one’s 
own tribe” (Daloz et al. 76). The marginality was a “gift” because 
it enabled them to see the world differently, to see the world 
in a way that those around them were unable to see it. When 
marginality was combined with courage, these people were 
able to respond in powerful and creative ways that served the 
common good. Writing recently in The Cresset, Samuel Torvend 
of Pacific Lutheran University, advocated the need for Lutheran 
colleges to be “centers of vigorous public engagement” where 
students learn to do more than “fit in” to the existing social 
order (Torvend 16-17). What Common Fire calls “marginality,” 
Torvend names as a “reforming vocation” that our colleges ought 
to foster, form and inspire in our students (18-19).
As I hope that I have made clear, the ultimate source for 
realizing that “reforming vocation” will come not through 
debates about the supposed opposition between liberal arts 
and professional education but through a deep engagement 
with the epistemological division that plagues them both. 
Too much has been written and said about a divide in higher 
education that does not really matter. While the subjects we 
teach and study—whether they be the liberal arts or profes-
sions—are important, they have been our exclusive concern for 
far too long. Today we must recognize that what we teach and 
study is not the issue as much as how we teach, learn and dis-
cover.  Purpose, epistemology and pedagogy ultimately should 
define the identity of Lutheran colleges, and this will certainly 
lead us to focusing on education for vocation over education 
for expertise and technique.
Endnotes
1. I am grateful to Edith Waldstein, my colleague at Wartburg 
College, for this insight.
2. Thank you to Kathryn Kleinhans, another Wartburg colleague, 
for this quip as well as her editorial suggestions and comments on the 
whole manuscript. Dan Kittle was a helpful reader as well.
3. In early Christianity, Docetism was the theological position that 
Jesus had only a spiritual being and only appeared to be human. It was 
condemned as a heresy. Although not directly cited, the logic of this 
argument is indebted to H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture 
(New York: Harper, 1951).
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